An economic experiment: IEM professor with colleagues have learned what can help to avoid a climate disaster
In the British academic journal “Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences” the article has been published by a team of authors including IEM TSU professor Marina Ryzhkova, the head of International Laboratory for Experimental and Behavioral Economics of NRE HSE Alexis V. Belianin and colleagues fr om Germany: Gianluca Grimaldi, Hainke Henning Shmidt and Till Rekvate. The article is dedicated to climate change and abilities of the society to cooperate in the face of the threat.
During the lab economic experiment in 2015-2016 the authors learned the activity of students from Tomsk, Moscow, Bonn and Kiel during the game imitating the probable condition of global climate change which may occur if people don’t work together and invest on time sufficient personal recourses into the initiatives preventing the climate change.
The lab economic experiment is similar to a business simulation, except one critical distinction in goal. In this case the goal is testing a scientific hypothesis of people behavior in a simulated economic situation. The lab economic experiments have been conducted in Tomsk for a long time led by IEM TSU professor Marina Ryzhkova who has more than 10 years of scientific experience in this field.
The participants represented their cities as well as countries. The organizers had provided simulated money for the experiment which the participants could invest into general fund to reduce the possibility (down to zero) of negative environmental events and so secure from collective losses uponoccurrence of those. The common good dilemma was the foundation of the experiment – in order to prevent a global catastrophe efforts of only one country are insufficient and coordinated actions of all states are in the absence of of one single administrative and coordination centre.
The scientists wanted to clarify the factors facilitating such cooperation. The standard economic prognosis concludes that the participants won’t invest into the common (general) fund, hoping the others will do that instead (so-called “free rider problem”). To make matters worse there are geopolitical, cultural and other differences. Does that mean the disaster is imminent?
Totally all the participants had the possibility to make a decision 10 times, one of which was chosen randomly. There were different conditions: sometime the participants knew wh ere their opponents were from, sometime they did not. In some simulations the participants were able to sanction each other personally, thus if one of the players considered the behavior of the other one inappropriate, he (she) could spend the money to strip the opponent of much larger sum.
The results disapproved the negative prognosis, it was found out that with international collaboration the level of cooperativity increases. For example, during the session “Bonn vs Kiel” the level of cooperativity was higher than during “Moscow vs Tomsk” one but when the Russian participants were in one team with the Germans their investment rate grew significantly and in majority of sessions reached the level of the Germans especially in cases when sanctions were possible. At the same time the participants gathered the general fund sufficient to prevent a possible disaster.
What does the outcome of the experiment tell us? The similarity of results in “blind” and “open” cooperation between the participants from different countries shows that people in general are ready to work together and keep the achieved agreements, Maria Ryzhkova comments. In our case it is highly likely that their behavior will be more “environmental” in real life as well, for example people will buy green products, save water and so on, especially if there are examples of such behavior.
Scientists note that the results of the research can be generalized for countries from different cultural areas and can also be used as recommendations for politicians and senior executives.
For information: “Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences” is one of the main outlets of The Royal Society, London. Published since 1800.
During the lab economic experiment in 2015-2016 the authors learned the activity of students from Tomsk, Moscow, Bonn and Kiel during the game imitating the probable condition of global climate change which may occur if people don’t work together and invest on time sufficient personal recourses into the initiatives preventing the climate change.
The lab economic experiment is similar to a business simulation, except one critical distinction in goal. In this case the goal is testing a scientific hypothesis of people behavior in a simulated economic situation. The lab economic experiments have been conducted in Tomsk for a long time led by IEM TSU professor Marina Ryzhkova who has more than 10 years of scientific experience in this field.
The participants represented their cities as well as countries. The organizers had provided simulated money for the experiment which the participants could invest into general fund to reduce the possibility (down to zero) of negative environmental events and so secure from collective losses uponoccurrence of those. The common good dilemma was the foundation of the experiment – in order to prevent a global catastrophe efforts of only one country are insufficient and coordinated actions of all states are in the absence of of one single administrative and coordination centre.
The scientists wanted to clarify the factors facilitating such cooperation. The standard economic prognosis concludes that the participants won’t invest into the common (general) fund, hoping the others will do that instead (so-called “free rider problem”). To make matters worse there are geopolitical, cultural and other differences. Does that mean the disaster is imminent?
Totally all the participants had the possibility to make a decision 10 times, one of which was chosen randomly. There were different conditions: sometime the participants knew wh ere their opponents were from, sometime they did not. In some simulations the participants were able to sanction each other personally, thus if one of the players considered the behavior of the other one inappropriate, he (she) could spend the money to strip the opponent of much larger sum.
The results disapproved the negative prognosis, it was found out that with international collaboration the level of cooperativity increases. For example, during the session “Bonn vs Kiel” the level of cooperativity was higher than during “Moscow vs Tomsk” one but when the Russian participants were in one team with the Germans their investment rate grew significantly and in majority of sessions reached the level of the Germans especially in cases when sanctions were possible. At the same time the participants gathered the general fund sufficient to prevent a possible disaster.
What does the outcome of the experiment tell us? The similarity of results in “blind” and “open” cooperation between the participants from different countries shows that people in general are ready to work together and keep the achieved agreements, Maria Ryzhkova comments. In our case it is highly likely that their behavior will be more “environmental” in real life as well, for example people will buy green products, save water and so on, especially if there are examples of such behavior.
Scientists note that the results of the research can be generalized for countries from different cultural areas and can also be used as recommendations for politicians and senior executives.
For information: “Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences” is one of the main outlets of The Royal Society, London. Published since 1800.